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Three novel forces have placed conflict law' in the forefront of legal
subjects and scholarly preoccupation. While these forces have been at
work changing the broad outlines of this field for a long time, recognition
has been greatest in the recent period under survey. The first of these forces
grows out of the new position of the United States. It is the rising interest
in the need for differentiation of norms between the international conflict2
and the interstate.
The second major force is the apparent reluctance on the part of
federal authorities, mainly the legislature and judiciary, to assert national
control of conflict conduct and norms. This withdrawal, already noted
earlier, seems to have reached a danger point. Perhaps as a corollary to
the second and perhaps responding to independent impulses is the third
force which might be stated to be the continued expansion of state authority.
All of these forces have been at work in Florida although possibly not
with the same intensity as in other places.
*This is the third in the Survey of Florida Law series and covers the cases contained in
Volumes 81 So.2d 697 through 96 So.2d 536 (August 29, 1957); 7 Fla. Supp. (1955)
through 9 Fla. Supp. (1957). Federal cases in the fifth circuit are included through
152 F. Supp. and 246 F.2d as well as the changes in the Florida Statutes made in the
regular session of the 1957 Florida Legislature. Wherever possible points discussed and
left unchanged by subsequent cases are merely crossreferred to the prior surveys which
are designated simply as 8 and 10 MiMMI L.Q. 1954 and 1956 respectively.
"Professor of Law and Director, Program in Intermerican Legal Studies, University
of Miami, School of Law. The author gratefully acknowledges the invaluable assistance
of Bertha L. Freidus in the preparation of this article.
1. See BAYITCII, CONFLICT LAW IN UNITED STATES TFA-TIES, (1955) and com-
ment thereon in Mueller, Book Review, 45 CALIF. L. REv. 394, note 13 at 397 (1957).
2. A new designation has been suggested by JEssuP, TRAN NATIONAL LAw
(1956). See Ebrenzweig, Interstate and International Conflicts Laws: A plea for Segre-
gation, 41 MINN. L. Rrv. 717 (1957). Another important contribution to clarification
of the areas that ought to be allotted these two branches of the conflict field is the series
of Bilateral Studies in Private International Law being published for the Parker School
of Foreign and Comparative Law by Oceana Publications. Number 8 on Australian-
American Private Int'l Law by Cowen has just appeared. For a review of No. 4-7 see
Mueller, Book Review, 45 CALIF. L. RFv. (1957) and especially note 2, for a list of
prior reviews. His suggestion that these volumes be maintained by annual supplementation
in the AM. J. CoMp. L. is excellent. This has already been done with Szladits, 5 AM. J.
COMp. L. 341 (1956). See also review by Thomas, of Eder, Colombian-American Private
Int'l Law, 11 SW, L.. 391 (1957).
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TiE EXERCISE OF CONFLICT JURISDICTION
Legislative Jurisdiction
Viewed generally, the legislature at is 1957 session did not push out
the frontiers of state3 authority to the same extent as in the prior session.
4
Most of the activity was in the form of perfecting and consolidating
control previously asserted. In the matter of jurisdiction for divorce matters
there was even an important withdrawal.5
One major piece of legislation must be noted, The Florida Arbitration
Code,6 becausc of the importance and novelty of the conflict provisions con-
tained therein.7 These provisions are designed to aid in the solution of
one of the gravest problems that has held back arbitration as a satisfactory
solution to legal questions especially in the transnational area; namely that
of the characterization of the agreement as procedural in the conflict sense
and hence often governable by the law of the forum. Other provisions
should help to remove any doubt as to the enforceability of arbitrations or
judgments entered in consequence thereon.0
The rule of the Parmalee cases1 0 was followed in Baker v. Commercial
Travelers' Mutual Ace. Ass'n." Some doubt has been cast on the validity
3. An interesting case construing states rights in the sea frontier, is State v. Massa-
chusetts Co., 95 So.2d 902 (Fla. 1957).
4. See 10 MIAMI L.Q. 257 (1957).
5. This consisted in the change of the residence requirements from ninety days
to six months, see Laws of Fla. c. 57-44 amending FLA. STAT. § 65.02(1957). Further
tightening in this field is evidenced by Laws of Fla. c. 57-258 adding FLA. STAT. § 65.20
(1957) providing a thirty day "cooling off" period. For the major discussion of this
problem see Murray, Domestic Relations, 12 U. MIAitu L. REV. (1958).
6. Laws of Fla. c. 57-402; FLA. STAT. §§ 57.10-57.31(1957). The legislative
history makes clear that both labor and commercial arbitration is included.
7. The author of this survey was happy to serve the Florida Bar as draftsman,
of this statute, together with Wesley A. Sturges. On the overall need and importance
of such an act for Florida, see Albritton, The Florida Arbitration Law, 31 FLA. BAR J. 121
(1957); Arbuse, The General Case for Arbitration, id. at 129; and for the historical back-
ground of this remedy under the former FLA. SrAT. C. 57(1955) see Yonge, The Arbitra-
tion of an Ordinary Civil Claim in Florida, 6 U. FLA. L. Ray. 157 (1953) whicli appears
in a slightly revised version in 1 FLA. LAw & PRACTICE 627 (1955). See also comment
in 8 MtAmt L.Q. 220 (1954). That the new remedy has broader uses see Laws of Fla.
c. 57-199 adding a new section FLA. STAT. 578.27 (1957) providing an arbitration com-
mittee to assist in determining claims arising out of failure of seeds to perform as indi-
cated by label.
8. That this is no mere academic speculation see Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of
America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956) and see Sigfreid v. Pan American World Airways, 230
F.2d 13 (5th Cir. 1956).
9. Especially the new FLA. STAT. §§ 57.27 (2), 57.31 (1957).
10. Parmalee v. Commercial Travelers Niut. Ace. Ass'n, 206 F.2d 523 (5th Cir.
1953); Parmalee v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 206 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1953).
"These cases involve the construction of a statutory extension of an earlier doctrine which
recognized that the insurance industry has always been peculiarly sensitive to state regu-
lation." For further discussion see 8 MiAMI L. Q. 209, 211 (1954). Analagous to this
problem is that of the Direct Action Statutes. See Leflar, Conflict of Laws, 1956
ANN. SURVEY A-m. L. 33 and notes; see also McI)onald, Direct Action Against Insurance
Companies, 1957 Wis. L. REV. 614, especially note 8 at 615.
11. 150 F. Supp. 725 (S.D. Fla. 1955). It was also relied on and applied in Shutt
v. Commercial Travelers' Mutual Ace. Ass'n. 229 F.2d 158 (2nd Cir. 1956) to dis-
tinguish the Tennessee statute therein construed.
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of the temporal distinction by the recent McGee case extending full faith
and credit to a California judgment rendered to enforce a policy entered
into before the statute. Vhilc it now seems clear that the power exists
to assert jurisdiction on the basis of an isolated transaction, the courts
appear reluctant to do so unless the legislative mandate is clear.' 2
There were several other interesting statutory enactments in the 1957
legislative session. In a general statute providing for registration of felons,
the language is found in section two:'3
Any person who has been convicted of a crime . . . in any court
I . . of any foreign state or country, which crime if committed
in the state of Florida would be a felony, shall forthwith . . .
register with the sheriff ...
Thcre can be no question of legislative authority but an interesting
problem in classification of crimes under the laws of other jurisdictions is
left without specific indication as to the standards to be applied) 4
In the matter of service on foreign corporations, the legislature rc-
pealed section 47.17 and provided that, on failure to comply with the
designation provision,15 process may be served "on any agent of such
foreign corporation transacting business for it" in the state.
In view of the extension of jurisdiction10 in other states this is a
conservative measure, particularly if "transacting business" is deemed to
evidence a more intimate connection than that involved in the XVeber17
case.
Another important statute left without specific territorial or substantive
limits is that requiring a writing to evidence an agreement to make a will,
legacy or devise.' In view of the legislative intent to include prior agree-
12. The Court in McGee supra apparently found such a mandate but query
whether some of its language indicates an intent to go beyond the insurance field allow-
ing such legislative policy to overflow into the more normal areas of commercial activity
permitting extraterritoriality there as well. See Ehrenzweig & Mills, Personal Service
Outside the State: Pennoyer v. Neff in California, 41 CALIF. L. Rzv. 383 (1953). See
also Loeflar, supra note 10; McDonald, supra note 10; see also Risijord, Conflict of Laws
Applicable to the Standard Automobile Liability Policy, 1957 Wis. L. REv. 586.
13. Laws of Fla., c. 57-19 § 2. See Lambert v. California, 26 U.S.L. WEEK, 4059
(U.S. Dec. 17, 1957) where a similar municipal ordinance was held violative of due
process.
14. Similarly Laws of Fla. c. 57-52 amending FLA. SrAT. § 205.432 (1955) im-
poses a Florida common law definition of "common ownership or management and con.
trol" on insurance companies "incorporated" in any foreign country.
15. FLA. STAT. §§ 47.34-36 (1955).
16. See Leflar, note 10 supra.
17. State ex Tel. Weber v. Register, 67 So.2d 619 (1953) and comment thereon
in 8 Muini L.Q. 214-215 (1954). But cf. language in McGee v. International Life
Lns. Co.,-U.S.-, 78 S.Ct. 119 (1957), ". . . a trend is clearly discernible toward
expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other
nonresidents."
18. Laws of Fla. c. 57-148 (1957).
1958]
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Most of the actions of the Florida Supreme Court in the period under




Two cases created an important extension of the doctrine of continuity
of jurisdiction. The first was Grant v. Corbitt.21 Here the court stated that
the original jurisdiction for determination of custody based on divorce was
sufficient to effect a change therein even though the mother was domiciled
in another state and the child's domicile would be presumed to be hers.
It was also held that custody could be awarded to a person not an original
party to the divorce proceeding. The rule that the child must be present
was affirmed.
In an earlier case, Watson v. Watson,22 the court set forth the rule
that modification of a support order based on personal jurisdiction over
H and W in 1947 could be made without new service of process on H,
even though he was no longer within the jurisdiction. This was based on
the holding that, with a specific reservation in the 1947 decree of juris-
diction to modify, a proceeding to modify was not a new action. While there
was actual notice in the Watson case, as well as appearance, the court
enunciated the rule that a change in persbn, status or property would be
supported by service by mail without the state.
23
The court also considered the question of jurisdiction for adoption
and determined that presence of the adoptee plus consent of one natural
parent and adequate notice to the other was sufficient.
2 4
Jurisdiction to Tax
In State ex rel Peninsular Tel. Co. v. Gay's important determinations
as to both legislative and judicial jurisdiction to tax were made.25 The
19. As was done by Laws of Fla. c. 57-158 (1957) which in amending FLA. STAT.
72.22 (1955) provided that nothing in the amendment would prevent the adopted child
from inheriting from the " . . . natural parents under the laws of this state or any state."
20. For general background see 8 MIAMI L.Q. 216 (1954), also 10 MIAMi L.Q.
264 (1956.21 95 So.2d 25 (Fla. 1957).
22. 88 So.2d 133 (Fla. 1956).
23. Relying on the rule of Moore v. Lee, 72 So.2d 280 (Fla. 1954).
24. In re Brown's Adoption, 85 So.2d 617, 619 (Fla. 1956).
25. 90 So.2d 132 (Fla. 1956).
26. As to source of information that might be used to limit the power to impose
taxes on mortgages and deeds, a party asserted, in State ex rel. Port Sewall Realty Co. v.
Green, 91 So2d 306 (Fla. 1957), the existence of a treaty between Canada and the
[VOL. XII
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court assumed the latter jurisdiction and then proceeded to limit the
former. It found that here all the steps in the issuance of bonds of a
Florida corporation took place outside the territory of the state, the mere
fact that they were secured by a pledge of Florida assets would not subject
them to a documentary stamp tax. There was a dissent in which Milledge,
J. said:
I cannot bring myself to the conclusion that a Florida corporation
can evade the documentary tax by the expedient of holding a di-
rector's meeting and signing and delivering the bonds outside the
state. . . . I think that the corporation has done nothing but put
its metaphorical hat on backward.
27
In strong contrast to this possibly radical self-denying interpretation
was the assertion of authority to tax the purchase and use of airplane parts
even though there might be a marginal effect on interstate and foreign
commerce.
28
Conflict of Jurisdiction- State and Federal
In Bert Lane Company v. International Industries,2 1 the court found
that there was a sufficient basis for the claim for equitable relief of unfair
competition to create state jurisdiction even though the right asserted
arose out of a patented process. The reasoning used to defeat the exclusive
federal jurisdiction over patent cases is analogous to that used to assert
the more limited interpretation of the federal question in normal federal
jurisdiction.30
The narrowness of result is shown by this language:
Whether the plaintiffs could have sued in a federal court for
infringement of their patent is not necessary to be decided. The
fact remains that they elected not to do so. . . . A determination
of their claim does not require a construction of the patent laws
nor a finding that there has been an infringement by the defendants
of their patent.31
Another aspect of potential conflict between the two jurisdictions was
considered in Jacksonville Blow Pipe Co. v. Reconstruction Finance Corp.82
United States. The court approved the reliance of the circuit judge on a letter from the
United States Department of State that no such treaty was in force between the coun-
tries in question that would affect the state's power to levy this form of taxation.
27. State ex rel. Peninsular Tel. Co. v. Gay, 90 So.2d 132, 136 (Fla. 1956).
28. L. B. Smith Aircraft Corp. v. Green, 94 So.2d 832, 836 (Fla. 1957) relying
in part on fixing by interpretation the term "common carrier" to the exemption language
of FIA. STAT. § 212.08 (3) (1957) and in part on the implied authority given to the
states by the Supreme Court in Braniff Airways v. Nebraska State Board, 347 U.S. 590
(1954 9. 84 So.2d 5 (Fla. 1955),
30. See 10 MiAmi L.Q. 286 (1956) and regarding the discussion of Cox v. Roth
see note 8 ALA. L. Rxv. 347 (1956).
31. See note 29 supra at 8.
32. 244 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1957).
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Here the court had to pass on the scope of judicial exceptions to the 179
prohibition against enjoining state court proceedings. It was held that ai
injunction was proper to prevent a replevin of goods sold to a purchase
at a bankruptcy sale. It is fortunate that the situations in which actur
conflicts arise in our dual system of courts are relatively infrequent. 3
Judicial jurisdiction - herein more on the semantics of domicile,
permanent resident and residence
A leading case, Bloomfield v. St. Petersburg Beach3' and the change ii
the language of the all-important jurisdiction for divorce statute make i
important to note the continuity into this period of this basic problem
The court takes the classic position that once the intent is clearly established
mere temporary withdrawal from the state will not work a loss of domicile
I should be noted that here domicle was being asserted for the purpose o
establishing voting rights. The court distinguished Campbell Y. Campbedl 3
In the light of the legislative change of the language in Florida Statuti
section 65.02, this distinction may have to be reconsidered. It is indeec
unfortunate that such a vital power-assertion principle should not be clari
fied by concerted action on the part of both court and legislature.3 6 Th
employment of the term "bona fide" could be taken to indicate an intentio
to convert residence to domicile.37 For the legislature to add to the con
fusion by the adoption of such new language as "bona fide resident" to ai
already crowded terminological field and for the court to continue a vagu
objective standard for measurement of subjective intent will only mak(
inevitable a broad and complete restudy of the entire field.37
33. For resolution of some other conflicts occurring in the period see In re Bead
Resort Hotel Corp., 141 F.Supp. 537, 543 (S.D. Fla. 1956); Maule Industries v. Gerste]
232 F.2d 294 at 298 note 4 (5th Cir. 1956); . . .jT]he referee .,.. will . .. certain]:
take the steps necessary to 'avoid unseemly conflicts between courts '.... , and Coasta
Petroleum Co. v. Collins, 234 F.Zd 319,320 (5th Cir. 1956) "It seems to us best t(
set aside any holding that the trustees are immune from suit, so that any future litiga
tion in the Florida State Courts will not be embarrassed by a claim of res judicata ....
34. 82 So.2d 364 (Fla. 1955). See commeut on this case in Stem, Domicile, titli
to appear in FLA. LAW AND PRACTICE.
35. 57 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1952) and comment in 8 MIAmi L.Q. 210, note 2 (1954 ,
and 10 MIAMI L.Q. 267 (1956).
36. That the same confusion exists in higher places see Fourco Glass Co. v
rransmirra Products Corp., 353 U.S. 222 (1957) especially at 226.
37. Laws of Fla. c. 57-58 (1957) amending FLA. STAT. § 636-26(1) (1955) ant
Laws of Fla. (1957) c. 57-244 amending FLA. STAT. § 475.17-18 (1957) employ th4
language "bona fide resident" in determining qualifications for insurance adjusters an(
real estate brokers respectively, and see Laws of Fla. c. 57-240 (1957) amending FLA
STAT. § 409.16(e) (1955) and FLA. STAT, § 409.40(8) (1955) with the language "citi
zen of the U.S. or has been a resident of the U.S. for at least twenty years .... .
37(a) Similar lack of realism has already brought pressure to bear on reform o
the statute of limitations field. See proceedings Fla. Bar. Comm. Continuing Law Reform
[VOT-. Xt
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Herein more on res-judicata and collateral estoppel
Another area of confusion noted has continued, reaching a high point
in a per curiam opinion of the court in Lawlor v. Lawlor." The entire
opinion is as follows:
Although the final decree in this case uses the term 'res judicata'
when it should have been 'estoppel by judgment,' the result
reached by the chancellor was proper. Affirmed.
Notwithstanding this, the rule of the Gordon30 Case was applied with
interesting and opposite results in two cases. Horn v. Horn,40 reached the
conclusion that a prior New York decree granting H a limited divorce
mensa et thoro on the ground of abandonment was no bar to W's divorce
action based on habitual intemperance. The bland statement that such
a prior judgment would not act as a total or partial bar was reiterated.
It was said to be so because the "causes of action" are different. Yet in
Field v. Field4' it was held that full faith and credit demanded at least
estoppel effect for a New Jersey separate maintenance decree in which H
participated. The Gordon42 rule was now limited to matters of strict res
judicata in the narrow sense as previously "defined" by the court.
In Carducci v. Carducci 3 the court approved, per curiam, the dis-
missal with prejudice of H's complaint for divorce on the grounds of
desertion and habitual indulgence in violent and ungovernable temper. W
had pleaded two Massachusetts proceedings as both res judicata and estoppel
by judgment, one granting her separate maintenance and the other dis-
missing H's action for divorce based on the latter of the two grounds
mentioned above. The implication from this holding is that the full court
has not yet made up its mind how far it will follow the identity of causes
of action concept and thus leaves open the door to an avoidance of the
full faith and credit effect of prior proceedings by manipulation of this
standard. The case can be understood only on the assumption that as a
policy question the court chooses to leave this matter open for settlement
at a future date. 44
38. 84 So.2d 913 (Fla. 1955).
39. 59 So.2d 40 (Fla. 1952) and comment in 8 MIaI L.Q. 209, 226 (1954).
40. 85 So.2d 860 (Fla. 1956).
41. 91 So.2d 640 (Fla. 1956); 68 So.2d 376 (Fla. 1953).
42. See note 39 supra.
43. 82 So.2d 360 (Fla. 1955).
44. Parks, A. J., dissented from the per curiam on the ground that the proceed-
ings pleaded did not contain sufficient proof of the defense and that the same rule should
apply therein as would in an action for divorce, the state having the same interest. Id.
at 362. For other cases considering this distinction see Shearn v. Orlando Funeral Home,
88 So.2d 591 (Fla. 1956); Woodson v. Woodson, 89 So.2d 665 (Fla. 1956); Young.
blood v. Taylor, 89 So.2d 503 (Fla. 1956).
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The change of statutory situation limitation on the rule of Wagner
v. Baron5 was followed and relied on in Thompson v. Thompson.
4"
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
General
In one of the most important decisions in the period under survey,
Pacific Mills v. Hillman Garnent,46a the court had to consider and pass
on the validity of a New York judgment based on consent to the juris-
diction of the courts of that state through an arbitration agreement. The
lower courts had granted and affirmed the granting of Hillman's motion
to dismiss and the supreme court reversed. They found that voluntary par-
ticipation in the arbitration in New York was consent to the entry of
judgment and would support the judgment against an initial due process
attack. While the statutory change in arbitration had not at this time
taken place, it was found that Florida public policy was not so inimical to
the quasi-judicial type procedure in that arbitration awards would, once
made, be enforced even under the old statute. The consent aspect provided
for sufficient notice, certainly as much, the court pointed out, as that pro-
vided for in the statute' 7 held constitutional in Weber v. Register.
4
In addition the court continued the construction of the Uniform Judicial
Notice Act 9 which required the pleading of the foreign law relied on so
as to make a clear record on this point but found the general allegation
that the judgment was entered in accordance with a procedure set forth
in article 84 of the arbitration statute 0 of the New York Civil Practice Act
to be sufficient. As thus construed the restrictive interpretation is much
more liberal than had earlier appeared.
The decision in this case is also important for the future construction
of the new Florida Arbitration Code5' in that the language used shows
an intent to change the attitude underlying the decision in Fenster v.
45. 64 So.2d 267 (Fla. 1953). The court stated:
The cases are legion which hold that res judicata is not a defense in a subse-
quent action where the law under which the first judgment was obtained is
different than that applicable to the second action, or there has been an
intervening decision, or a change in the law between the first and second
judgment, creating an altered situation.
See comment thereon in 8 MIAMI L. Q. 209, 230 (1954) and in 10 MIAMI L, Q.
269 (1956).
46. 93 So.2d 90 (Fla. 1957).
46a. 87 So.2d 599 (Fla. 1956).
47. FLA. STAT. § 47.16 (1957).
48. State ex rel. Weber v. Register, 67 So.2d 619 (Fla. 1953) and comment
thereon in 8 MIAMI L. Q. 214-216 (1954).
49. Pacific Mills v. Hillman Garment, 87 So.2d 599, 601 (1956), where the court
relies on Kingston v. Quimby, see 80 So.2d 455 (Fla. 1955), 10 MIAmi L.Q. 261 (1956).
50. N.Y. CIV. PRxAc. ACT § 1450.
51. FL&. STAT. §§ 57.10-57.31 (1957).
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Makovsky which had stated the classic "ouster of jurisdiction" rule. This
language of the court58
. . . when an arbitration procedure is employed in a particular
state then the law of the forum controls the disposition of the
ultimate rights of the parties . . .
also indicates an intention to take a liberal attitude by adopting in advance
of the new statute the classification now established. The passage must be
understood, by the holding in the principal case, to mean the law of that
forum. To give such a broad effect to a substantive classification is most
important.6
4
In granting full faith and credit to a New Jersey judgment, the court
considered a collateral attack raising lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter in the prior proceeding. 5 Vonella recovered in a Workmen's Com-
pensation proceeding which recovery was reduced to judgment under the
New Jersey procedure. The decisive question before the Florida Supreme
Court when enforcement was sought was the matter of the statute of lim-
itations. Following the strict rule on judicial notice, " appellants failure
to put appellee on notice in the lower court of the provisions relied on
led to the proper assumption that the New Jersey statute was the same as
the Florida statute, e.g., that failure to plead it acted as a waiver. Not-
withstanding this correct decision, the court considered the law and found
it to be the same in fact. 7
A different result was reached in cutting off the obligation arising under
a foreign decree by use of a local statute. W had entered into a separation
agreement with H in Pennsylvania and H had established a trust fund and
agreed to pay the deficiency between income from the trust and the amount
stipulated in the separation agreement. This had been required by decree
of the Pennsylvania court." I had duly performed until his death and
the executor of his estate paid the amount due W for the last year of his
life. W failed to file a claim against the estate within the period of eight
months.5 9
The court held 0 that even if it were assumed that this obligation
survived, there was nothing to take it out of the scope of the short statute
52. 67 So.2d 427 (Fla. 1953).
53. Pacific Mills v. Hillman Garment, 87 So.2d 599, 602 (Fla. 1956).
54. At the judgment level it is curious that the court should have added, id., "we
have not been referred to any decision passing upon the enforceability in a sister state
of a judgment entered in the New York courts pursuant to [this] arbitration procedure."
55. Aboandandolo v. Vonella, 88 So.2d 282 (Fla. 1956).
56. Kingston v. Quimby, 80 So.2d 455 (Fla. 1955) and comment in 10 MIAMI
L. Q. 261 (1956).
57. But cf. the statement of the court in Walter Denson & Son v. Nelson, 88
So.2d 120, 122 (Fla. 1956): "Ordinarily statutes of limitation are construed as being
applicable to the remedy and not to the substantive right."
58. Van Sciver v. Van Sciver, 337 Pa. 390, 12 A.2d 108 (1940).
59. As required by FLA. STAT. § 733.16 (1957).
60. Van Sciver v. Miami Beach First National Bank, 88 So.2d 912 (Fla. 1956).
1958)
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of limitation. In spite of its embodiment in a valid foreign decree the
obligation was found to be merely contractual.
On the survival question the court said:
I . . IThe obligation remains a purely contractual one arising out
of the promise voluntarily made by the decedent during his life
with the intention of binding his executor after his death. Without
such a contractual obligation, the plaintiff (W) would have had
no claim at all, since any right to support arising out of the pre-
existing marital status would have been extinguished upon the
death of the husband.,
Important cases in the general field of faith and credit to divorce
decrees were also decided in this period. In Sorrells v. Sorrels61 2 the court
had to consider the effect of H's ex parte Alabama divorce on a prior
Florida separate maintenance decree.63 The court reiterated its reliance on
the previously announced rule of Pawley v. Pawley64 and stated that it
would grant validity to the Alabama decree to the extent of terminating
the status but would not consider it to have dealt with the duty of
support. This same problem arose in Armstrong v. Armstrong,6 5 where
the Florida court had left rather ambiguous the question of whether it
intended to cut off W's right to alimony in an ex parte proceeding by H.
The language, quoted by both the Ohio Supreme Court and the United
States Supreme Court, was ". . . specifically decreed that no award of
alimony be made to the defendant. .... ". r
In the opinion of the court, Florida had not adjudicated the alimony
question and Ohio could therefore do so without raising a full faith and
credit question.6
7
61. Id. at 914. The same general result is reached as to support money for chil-
dren awarded by a divorce decree; Guinta v. Lo Re, 159 Fla. 448, 31 So.2d 704 (1947).
But cf. the result in the recent case of Flagler v. Flagler, 94 So.2d 592 (Fla. 1957),
where support payments ordered in a paternity suit were held not to survive. The place
of principal administration was Illinois. A contrary result was reached in Johnson v. Every.
93 So.2d 390 (Fla. 1957), which found language in a decree ordering alimony payments
until death or remarriage of wife sufficient expression of intention to make the obligation
survive. There was a strong dissent on the question of intention but the rule of the
principal case as to cofiforming to the eight-month claim statute was reiterated, Id. at
393 (majority) and 397 (dissent). The amount due was held to be incapable of increase
either retrospectively or prospectively after H's death.
62. 82 So.2d 684 (Fla. 1955).
63. Sorrells v. Sorrells, 53 So.2d 645 (Fla. 1951).
64. See discussion in 8 MrAmI L.Q. 225 and note 82. In an otherwise superb
survey article by Leflar there is a small factual error. He has it that the divorce was a
Florida one when in fact it was Cuban. 1956 ANN. Sotvav AM. L. 33 note 90.
65. 350 U.S. 568 (1955).
66. Id. at 569.
67. On this state of the record, Justice Frankfurter would have dismissed the writ as
improvidently granted. Perhaps the most important aspect of the case, as subsequent events
bore out, was the concurrence of Black, J., id. at 575. This opinion found that Florida
adjudicated the alimony question and fell back on the rule of Estin to find that such a
determination was not entitled to full faith and credit as a matter of constitutional policy.
[VOL. XlII
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An apparently sound result reached in In re Bourne's Estate0s which
considered the scope of collateral attack permitted in a New York court
under the prevailing Florida law and applying the rule of Johnson v. Muel-
berger"' found that the daughter of a former marriage was foreclosed from
making such an attack since she had no vested rights but only an expectancy
in the estate being administered, 70 was reversed70" by the appellate division
finding that the jurisdictional question was still open. This result clearly
limits the broad rule of the Johnson case which was not based solely on
the appearance of 11 but on the overall scope of Florida law as to collateral
attack. Further consideration by the New York Court of Appeals may well
result in the restoration of the broader effect which seems more in accord
with the spirit of the Supreme Court holding in Johnson.
The final case of importance is that of Berknan v. Ann Lewis Shops?'
Plaintiff was assignor of judgments obtained in Florida against a subsidiary
of defendant. Jurisdiction in Florida had been based on the substituted
service statute held constitutional in Weber v. Register.72 They were found
undoubtedly valid against the subsidiary but the crucial question was
whether, in enacting Florida Statute section 47.16 (1957) the Florida
Legislature had intended to overthrow the rule that ownership of a sub-
sidiary did not bring the parent within the jurisdiction without more. The
court made two important declarations. First that it could inquire into
This Black concurrence assumes great importance because in the subsequent case of Van-
derbilt v. Vanderbilt,-U.S.-, 77 S. Ct. 1360 (1957), it became the rule of the court. See
his comments on Thompson Y. Thompson, 350 U.S. at 581 (1955). For an excellent
review of the problem see Frankfurter, J., dissenting in Vanderbilt, 77 S. Ct. 1363-65 and
a fine general discussion of the problem in Leflar, Conflict of Laws, 1956 ANN. SUaVFY
Am!. L. 38 and especially his comment on Kessler v. Farquier Nat'l Bank, id. at note 83
which should be compared with prior comments in 8 MIAMI L.Q. 216 (1954) and 10
MIAMI L.Q. 262 (1956).
68. 142 N.Y.S.2d 777 (Surr. Suffolk 1955). For a prior hearing of this case see
206 Misc. 378, 133 N.Y.S.2d 192 (1954).
69. 340 U.S. 581 (1951).
70. The surrogate court relied on De Marigny v. De Marigny, 43 So.2d 442 (Fla.
1949). For other cases in New York granting full faith and credit to Florida proceedings
see Astor v. Astor, 162 N. Y. S.2d 87 (S.Ct. 1957) (no adjudication in Florida
as to status of either V1 or W2 as lawful wife) for prior proceedings see 161 N.Y.S.
2d 443 (S.Ct. 1957) and 160 N.Y.S.2d 103 (S. Ct. 1957); Vallianos v. Vallianos, 161
N.Y.S.2d 918 (S.Ct. 1957) (routine credit); Steinhauser v. Steinhauser, 158 N.Y.S.2d
854 (App. Dis. 2d Dept. 1956) (no modification alimony except in Florida granting
court). And see the interesting involvement of a divorce decree in Vermont-New York
faith and credit situation in Chapman v. Chapman, 158 N.Y.S.2d 674 (S.Ct. 1956).
No faith and credit was given in Aspromonte v. Aspromonte, 164 N.Y.S.2d 299 (S.Ct.
1957) and in Schwartz v. Schwartz, 164 N.Y.S.2d 943 (S.Ct. 1956) inquiry into lack
of domicile for divorce in Florida was barred by plea of constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination.
70a. 2 A.2d 896, 157 N.Y.S.2d 777 (S. Ct. 1956).
71. 246 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1957).
72. Cf. discussion supra note 17 and 8 NIL4miI L.Q. 214-216 (1954) and com-
ments on similar problem in Leflar, 1956 ANN. SURVEY Am!. L. 25 especially that the
trend seems to be in favor of expanded state jurisdiction both by service personally out-
side the state and substituted service within and his discussion of the new section 17 of
the Illinois Civil Practice Act. See also the valuable note, Due Process of Law and Notice
by Publication, 32 lN,-n LT. 469 (1957).
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the jurisdictional basis because it had not been clearly litigated in Florida
and that this would not not violate the full faith and credit clause and
second, that the Legislature did not intend such a result. Whether they
could have done so had they been found to have intended the result is
a question left open by the court.
Both majority73 and dissent 4 cite comments made on the Weber
case75 for their own purposes. It seems to me, that, while the result in
Weber ought to be opposed,7a the case would have indicated an intent
to subject such activities to Florida control. Distinguishable on its facts
it may be from the present case, but those facts are such as to make
the present case really an a fortiori one. Nor does it seem reasonable to
continue the Cannon"' rule in face of clear legislative intent to subject
corporate activity to greater control.
77
Impairment of contract
Slate v. Berkshire Life Insurance Company78 has been set apart because
it involves not only full faith and credit and the Erie doctrine but mainly
the matter of a state impairment of the obligations of contract. Beneficiary
brought action to recover the proceeds of a life insurance policy and for
attorney's fees. 79 It was admitted that this was an Ohio contract and that
Ohio had no such provision for recovery of attorney's fees. The court felt
that faith and credit was not technically involved and distinguished the
Dunken case 0 on the ground that the Florida statute does not attempt to
interfere with foreign contracts or business activity. Since it is limited to
"rendition of judgment" this presupposes jurisdiction over the defendant
company as well as such contact with the state as to allow it to assert
such a public policy in the regulation of that industry. Since this is a
diversity jurisdiction case, the federal court is but another court of the state
and Florida law is binding on it, unless it conflict with other constitutional
73. Berkman v. Ann Lewis Shops, 246 F.2d 44, 50 (2d Cir. 1957).
74. Id. at 52.
75. 67 So.2d 427 (Fla. 1953); 8 MIAMi L.Q. 209, 214-216 (1954).
75a. Cf. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co. -U.S.-, 78 S.Ct. 119 (1957).
76. "In the leading case of Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing, 267 U.S. 333
(1925) . . . , the Supreme Court held that a foreign corporation that solicited customers
and sold and distributed its products in North Carolina through a wholly-owned sub-
sidiary was not amenable to suit in a forum of that state since the identity of the two
corporations was maintained and the activities within the state were actually carried on
by the subsidary." See note 73 supra at 48.
77. Further support for this construction of the legislative intent will be found in
Laws of Fla. c. 57-747 amending FLA. STAT. § 47.16 (1955) by adding (2) which
includes within the basic service provisions foreign manufacturers doing business in Flor-
ida through brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors. It makes any such act give rise
to a conclusive presumption that the person or corporation is engaging in a business or
business venture within the meaning of (1).
78. 142 F. Supp. 691 (S.D. Fla. 1956).
79. As provided by FLA. STAT. § 625.08 (1957).
80. Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Dunken, 266 U.S. 389 (1925).
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principles.8 ' No such federal constitutional objections were found. Why
the court did not find Ohio public policy embodied in its statutes read into
the policy thus presenting the faith and credit issue is left without a more
satisfactory answer than the statement that the clause containing that
declaration of statutory policy ". .. technically is not involved.1
8 2
STATE LAW IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
The Erie Doctrine
In a general statute 3 intended to streamline the operations of the
highest court of this state, the 1957 legislature took cognizance of an
important and perplexing problem in this field, namely that of filling the
gap in state jurisprudence when it becomes material in the several federal
courts. It perfected a provision originally enacted in 1945 giving the court
power to answer "questions or propositions of the laws of this state, what
are determinative of the said cause (therein pending), and (when) there
are no clear controlling precedents in the decisions. . ... ,84
The cases arising in the federal courts in the period surveyed range
from absolute respect for "state law" to wild hunting for "the state law"
when none exists, and include all of the subtle shades in between. One
of the finest examples of direct control occurred in Hunter v. United States
Fidelity and Guaranty Co.85 The entire opinion is as follows:
Per Curiam. Upon the authority of a decision filed . . . by the
Supreme Court of Florida in a companion case involving the
same law and facts . . . the judgment of the court below is
Affirmed. 6
In complicated litigation involving relationships between a general
carrier and an excess insurance carrier the basic liability arose out of a
Florida litigation.8 7 The excess carrier had refused liability on the grounds
of unreasonable delay in the transmission of notice.88  Here the court
81. The court also disposed of Holderness v. Hamilton Fire Ins. Co., 54 F. Supp.
145 (S.D. Fla. 1944), which applied the Durnken limitation construing the statutory
attorney's fees as part of every contract by mention of the later Florida case, Feller v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc., 57 So.2d 581 (Fla. 1952), which changed the interpreta-
tion and which is now the law.
82. See note 78 sumra at 692. The meaning of "technically" is also left unanswered!
83. Laws of Fla. c. 57-274 revising and amending FLA. STAT. C. 25 (1955) relat-
ing to the organization of the supreme court.
84. FLA. STAT. § 25.031 (1957). It is unfortunate that this provision is not more
widely used.
85. 231 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1956).
86. The companion case is to be found in 86 So.2d 421 (Fla. 1956).
87. Florida Greyhound Lines v. Jones, 60 So.2d 396 (Fla. 1952).
88. Greyhound Corp. v. Excess Insurance Co. of America, 233 F.2d 630 (5th Cir.
1956); see also parallel case, American Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Greyhound Corp., 232
F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1956) which was followed in Springer v. Citizens Casualty of New
York, 246 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1957).
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had to look a bit further afield to find authority but discovered it in a
prior case in the same circuit that arose out of other Florida litigation.s9
It was considered proper controlling authority in that it not only arose
in Florida but involved the construction of a Florida contract. In Chaachou
v. American Central Insurance Company 0 this delightful statement con-
cerning the doctrine is found.
Taking our Erie lights, as best we can, ... Florida, whose policy
controls here, recognizes this, we think, as a valid area for con-
tract .... "
In MacCurdy v. United States "- the court had to determine the meaning
of Florida law applicable under the provisions of the Federal Tort Claims
Act, It was found that the dangerous instrumentality rule made contributory
negligence of the driver imputable to the owner, barring recovery by the
owner for the death of his wife and for the damage to his automobile.
After enunciating a general rule in these terms the court then went on
to say:
The Supreme Court of Florida has never had a case exactly like
this, but the general rule is that in actions for wrongful death com-
pensation may not be recovered for the benefit of persons who
concurred in the injury and death. . . . This rule is based upon
public policy and the principal (sic!) that no one should be
permitted to profit by his own wrong.03
Moritt v. Fine"' involved the standard Erie reference to Florida law
on the question of the meaning of that state's Statute of Frauds. It was
held that a broker's signature on a "deposit receipt" merely to acknowledge
payment without intention to sign for sellers with respect to terms of
purchase did not satisfy the statute. Brown, J., dissenting, had this to add:
Reminiscent to me of the nice, intriguing dialectic inquiries of
common law pleading, a point of view which Florida Judges,
steeped in the lore and traditions of their local practice, seem
reluctant to discard. . . , the nub of the Court's decision is that
the pleaded contract violated the statute of frauds because the
89. This case, Phoenix Indemnity Co. v. Anderson's Groves, was relied on by both
majority and dissent. Greyhound Corp. v. Excess Insurance Co. of America, note 88 supra
at 636 and 640 respectively.
90. 241 F.2d 889 (5th Cir. 1957).
91. Id. at 892. Reference is made to Mereditl v. \Vintcr llavcn, 320 U.S.
228 (1943), see discussion in 10 MIAIl L.Q. 284 note 173 (1956). The substantive
question involved in the case, avoidability of standard extended coverage policy for false
statements, is not novel or important and the court apparently heeded its "erie lights".
For another routine Eric case, see American Insurance Co. v. Burson, 213 F.2d 487 (5th
Cir. 1954); broad interpretation of "theft" tinder Florida law properly applicable.
92. 143 F. Supp. 60 (N.D. Fla. 1956).
93. Id. at 65. The result was affirmed on appeal, 246 F.Zd 67 (5th Cir. 1957),
relying on a late Flckida case and converting the doctrine into one of general respondeat
superior.
94. 242 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1957).
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Seller did not sign on the right line. .... But neither the statute
of frauds nor the elements of a contract requires such ritualism.,
Two other problems were dealt with in the area of the Erie doctrine.
The first is that of determining the scope of the state law to be applied,
the special procedure-substance classification in the federal diversity jurisdic-
tion. Pogue v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company6 was an action by a
customer against a storekeeper to recover for injuries in a "slip and fall"
situation, The court found that under the applicable Florida law the ques-
tion of control over the creation of the hazard was crucial but stated
that the decision on whether this was such a triable issue of fact as to
preclude summary judgment was a federal one not subject to state law
control.
\Ve do not think that we should seek to discover how that appar-
ently unique doctrine of Florida law should be applied to the
evidence in this case, for we consider it purely procedural and
without application to a case tried in the Federal Court .
The kind of jury trial to which the parties are entitled in federal
courts . .. is that preserved by the seventh amendment of the
Constitution, to which the doctrine of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tomp-
kins . . . is of course subservient.9 7
The second of these problems is that of finding a solution in the case
where state law is admittedly applicable but none can be found. Since the
courts have not yet begun to use the statute set forth at the beginning
of his section,97 0 they are forced to proceed by analogy or sonic other less
than exact means of determining that body of doctrine.
Consider the case of Howard v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Com-
pany 8 where the court could find no specific instance involving the appli-
cation of the Florida attractive nuisance doctrine to the facts. It said
that the court
...has not circumscribed itself to the application of any single
principle, but rather has considered all factors which properly bear
on the reasonableness of a property-owner's acts."
95, Id. at 132-133. Footnotes of the court omitted. For cases construing the Florida
law in the insurance brokerage area and reaching a similar result, see Peddy v. Pacific
Employers Insurance Company, 246 F.Zd 306 (5th Cir. 1957); National Fire Ins. Co.
y. Board of Public Instruction, 239 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1956) applying the Florida valued
property clause, as well as FLA. STAT. § 625.08 (1957) providing for attorney's fees.
96. 242 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1957).
97. The court's careful review and summary of "the apparently unique" doctrine
of Florida substantive law was applied and followed in a later case, Goldman v. Holly.
wood Beach Hotel Company, 244 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1957). The result in the principal
case should be contrasted with State Mutual Life Assurance Co. v. Wittenberg, 239
F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1956), applying state law with respect to determining when the burden
of proof should be imposed. For a generally excellent discussion of substance-procedure
see Drinan v. A. I. Lindemann & Hoverson Co., 238 F.2d 72 (7th Cir. 1956).
97a. FLA. STAT. § 25.031 (1957).
98. 231 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1956).
99. Id. at 594.
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On the basis of this generalized rule the federal court then felt free tc
determine the particular case. In another case100 involving the questior
of the necessity for payment of the excess judgment before the insured
could recover damages for breach of the insurer's duty to settle the claim:
a precise point which the Florida court had not determined, the federal
court avoided the need for a prior determination of state law by exercising
other parts of the broader federal jurisdiction than the question of damages
Finally in a case101 involving the construction of the innkeepers lia
bility statutes' 02 the district court used the reverse technique stating:
There are no decisions by the Florida Supreme Court construing
these statutes, but the Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, has con-
sidered the same in two cases . These decisions . . . appear to.
be controlling these cases., 1
Extended Erie doctrine
In the previous survey104 mention was made of the emergence of this
new area wherein state law is being applied in the non-diversity jurisdiction
of the federal courts. This application occurs in two different types of
setting. The first is where the Congress in the exercise of its power has
made a particular choice or use of state law explicitly binding on the federal
courts. The second is that in which the courts find such use by judicial
interpretation. The first raises a question of improper or possibly uncon-
stitutional abandonment of power by Congress; the second a willing-
ness to create diversity where uniformity might well better be the goal.
A fine illustration of the split which exists in both settings is the
recent Supreme Court decision in De Sylva v. Baltimore.1°5 Contrast the
language from the opinion of the court, Harlan, J.,106
The scope of a federal right is, of course, a federal question, but
that does not mean that its content is not to be determined by
state, rather than federal, law. . . . This is especially true where
100. Dotschay v. National Mutual Ins. Co., 246 F.2d 221 at 222 (5th Cir. 1957),
The precise language of the court is worth quoting:
We do not find it necessary to decide that question in advance of the State
courts, for the jurisdiction of the federal district court was more elastic than
simply to award damages.
101. Lazare Kaplan & Sons v. Pensacola Hotel Co., 153 F. Supp. 31 (N.D. Fla.
1957).
102, FLA. STAT. §§ 509.111 and 509.121 (1957).
103. See note 101 supra at 33. A variant of this is to be found in Meehan v. Grimaldi
& Grimaldi, Inc., 240 F.2d 775, 777 (5th Cir. 1957), where the court stated: "No Flor-
ida cases are cited by the appellee that indicate that the Florida Supreme Court would
not follow the principles mentioned in these cases." For another example of the willing.
ness to predict with greater abandon see Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co. v. Baese,
136 F. Supp. 683 (M.D. Tenn. 1956). And see discussion 10 MIAmv L.Q. 281-2 (1956)
and authorities therein mentioned.
104. 10 MIAMI L.Q. 286 and note 186 (1956).
105. 351 U.S. 570 (1956).
106. Id. at 580.
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a statute deals with a familiar relationship; there is no federal law
of domestic relations, which is primarily a matter of state concern.
With that of the concurrence by Douglas, J..:107
The meaning of the word "children" as used in section 24 of the
Copyright Act is a federal question. Congress could of course give
the word the meaning it has under the laws of the several states.
* . . But I would think the statutory policy of protecting dependants
would be better served by uniformity than by the diversity which
would flow from incorporating into the Act the law of forty-eight
States.
Pursuing the technique of remitting a decision on the content of the
federally created right will eventually end with a determination of the
scope at the same time. This line is too thin to maintain, epecially in
the face of the apparent intent of this highest tribunal to enlarge the scope
of state law within the diversity jurisdiction which must necessarily overflow
into the area of determination of federally created rights. This becomes
particularly true when one rcalizcs that the federal judiciary at the district
court level is filled with judges often more familiar with state than federal
law.'
08
Several local cases were also decided in this period in this area. Richter's
Loan Co. v. United States'00 intimated that state law might well be used
to determine the effect of a slightly incorrect filing of a tax lien.
110
In another most important case1 ' the court refused to go along with
cutting down the scope of federal jurisdiction by expanding the scope of the
diversity jurisdiction. Admitting that, were this an ordinary diversity case,
state law as to controlling periods of limitation would control, it reasserted
the admiralty character of action on a charter party which incorporated by
reference the one year limitation contained in the Carriage of Goods by
107. Id. at 583. -
108. Illustrations of fields in which the legislative direction was used are: social
security-RobIes v. Folsom, 239 F.2d 562 (2nd Cir. 1956); Warrenberger v. Folsom,
140 F. Supp. 610 (M.D. Penn. 1956); but cf. strong contra holding favoring the federal
standard in construing meaning of remarriage in Sparks v. United States, 153 F. Supp.
909 (Vt. 197); tort claims-Massachusetts Bonding and Ins. Co. v. United States, 352
U.S. 128 (1956) and comment 43 A.B.A.J. 255 (1957); natilialization-United States
v. Milana, 148 F. Supp. 152 (E.D. Mich. 1957).
On the effect of the judicial extension of state law in diversity see especially,
Bank of America v. Parnell, 352 US. 29 (1956) and comments thereon 10 MiAMI L.Q.
423 (1957) and 43 A.B.A.J. 156 (1957). An extremely interesting combination of leg-
islative and judicial localization is Barnes v. Union Pacific RR., 119 F. Supp, 198
(S.D. Idaho, 1956).
109. 235 F.2d 753 (5th Cir. 1956).
110. A similar use of state law in a government contract case was made in Sea-
board Machinery Corp. v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 149 F. Supp. 362 (N.D. Fla. 1957);
cf. in general on this problem Miller v. Arkansas, 352 US. 187 (1956) noted in
43 A.B.A.J. 256 (1957).
I. J. B. Effenson Co. v. Three Bays Corp., 238 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1956).
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Sea Act. This result was reached even in the absence of specific federal
statutory authorization.'
1 2
And finally careful consideration must be given Fahs v. Martin."13
This was an admittedly non-diversity action and yet the court felt that
it should not decide the question whether federal or Florida law should
make the choice of the applicable substantive law."'
It resolved the problem with this statement:
• . . (I)n deciding how the matter should be characterized for
conflict of law purposes (italics in original), it is clear that the law
of the forum should control. Either as a federal court or in the
role of a Florida court, we conceive of the matter as one of usury
for the purpose of applying conflict of laws rules; for the applicable
body of conflicts rules (either federal or Florida) is predicated on
a framework of either federal or Florida legal concepts, not this
peculiar differentiation existing only in some New York case." 3
and then proceeded to decide the substantive part of the case on the basis
of what might be called the general choice of law rules regarding usury. 11
The problem of the conflict, of laws in the non-diversity federal
jurisdiction has not been resolved but rather postponed. Apparently it
will not be resolved until the courts are faced with a case in which the
rule of the forum, now defined as the state in which the non-diversity
court sits rather than the court itself, and the rule of the Supreme Court
differ. That lack of difference was the basis for postponement, a most
unfortunate postponement in view of the rising tendency to fractionalize
statutes and even constitutional principles once thought to embody
policies favoring national rather than territorial uniformity.
CHOICE OF LAW
Creation and transfer of interests in tangible chattels
Once again the statutory law regarding that most important "tangible
and mobile chattel"' 17 has not been changed and the court has had
112. See especially discussion of Sheibel v. Agwilines, Inc., 156 F.2d 636 (2nd Cir.
1946) id. at 615-16. But cf. incorporation of state law oni survival in general maritime
tort in Meade v. Luksefjell, 148 F. Supp. 708 (S.D. N.Y. 1957).
113. 224 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1955). Not only for the point now under discussion
but because it represents a fine example, perhaps almost unique, of careful considera-
tion of characterization in the conflict of laws.
114. See especially the remarks of the court on the kind of uniformity that it felt
was most important in the field of taxation, id. at 396.
115. Id. at 396-7; footnotes of the court omitted.
116. This particular solution to the problem of whose characterization, which is
really not a solution at all, was cited and followed in Edward E. Morgan Co. v. United
States, 230 F.2d 896, 902 (5th Cir. 1956): "We think it is unnecessary to decide
whether a federal district court sitting in Texas in a case where jurisdiction is not based
on diversity of citizenship should resolve a conflict of laws question by the law of the
forum, i.e. Texas, or by a general rule or federal doctrine." (Emphasis supplied) Note
that the specific question in Fahs was characterization and this has now been generalized
to "conflict of laws."
117. See 10 MuAsrr L.Q. 290 (1956).
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occasion to reiterate1 18 the McQueen-Livingston doctrine,"8  as extended
by the Vincent case.""
In Lefcourt v. Streit,1'20 the court dealt with the interesting question
of the construction of the statute which prohibits a person previously con-
viced of perjury from testifying in any court in this state. 2 1 The statute
left open the question as to the territorial scope intended and, as stipulated
on the appeal, the conviction had taken place in New York. Relying first
on the general rule that the courts of one state will not enforce'the penal
laws of another'22 the court went on to consider the law chosen, the law
of New York. Applying the whole law of New York, it found that the
courts of that state would not bar a witness convicted in another state
from testifying in New York. The court stated:' -2 3
It is therefore clear that plaintiff's conviction would not have
served to bar his testimony in the state of New York.
While the whole New York law speaks in terms of any felony, the
court has in effect supplied the modification of the statute in question to
conviction of perjury in a court of this state and has done so by an un-
conscious use of the renvoi doctrine in a most unusual setting. 2 4
Validity and effects of foreign marriage
In two recent cases the court considered the validity and effects of a
foreign marriage without any specific reference to the law of the place
of celebration which would have been normal in the circumstances.
Mahan v. Mahan'25 involved an annulment action brought by W on
the grounds of lack of capacity due to intoxication. The court took
"judicial notice" that Folkston, Georgia, appears to be the "Gretna Green"
of Florida couples, but reached the decision purely on the basis of general
118. In Dicks v. Colonial Finance Corp., 85 So.2d 874, 876 (Fla. 1956), the
original transfer took place in Georgia and Colonial was first to place its lien on record. The
assigned conditional sales contract on the basis of which Colonial acted was held to
bind on Dicks as it bound the party from whom he took his interest. See also signifi-
cant comments on faith and credit in this field by. Reese, reviewing Lalive, The Transfer
of Chattels in Conflict of Laws, 42 A.B.A.J. 97011956) and in general as reported, his
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws (2d ed).
118(a) MeQueen v. M. and J. Finance Corp., 59 So.2d 49 (Fla. 1952); Livingston
v. National Shawmut Bank of Boston, 62 Sol2d 13 (Fla. 1952). Quoted with approval in
Clinger v. Reliable Discount Co., 80 So.2d 606, 607 (Fla. 1955). See the discussion in
8 MAMI L.Q. 241-244 (1954).
119. Vincent v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 75 So.2d 778 (Fla. 1954). See
comment in 10 MIAMI L.Q. 290-291 (1956).
120. 91 So.2d 852 (Fla. 1956).
121. FLA. STAT. § 90.07 (1957).
122. See authorities cited in Lefcourt v. Street, note 120 supra at 854.
123. Id. at 855.
124. For previous discussion of construction of territorial scope of statutory lan-
guage, see 8 MIAMI L.Q. 209, 219 and note 54 (1954).
125,. 88 So.2d 545 (Fla. 1956).
1958]
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and Florida law. It did not even make a statement that the law of the two
states could be presumed the same.'
-2
The second case, Teel v. Nolan Brown Motors,' paid greater heed to
the law of the place of celebration, again Georgia. H had been killed in
the course of employment and the deputy commissioner had exercised his
discretionS' to make the compensation payable to the minor children of
H and '\XW, who were actually dependent. Both W, and W, acquiesced in
this order and sought review only of the determination of widowhood.
I and W, were married in Georgia in 1938 and had lived together for
ten years. II and W, were married in the same state in 1950. The court
reversed the order below holding that W, had sustained the burden of
proof in overcoming the presumption of validity of the second marriage.
Florida law was used to determine the status question" 9 and the only
reference to the lex loci came in this statement:
... (W)e judicially know that the State Bureau of Vital Statistics
is the custodian of records that reflect the granting of divorces in
every county in Florida. A similar agency exists in the State of
Georgia . . . . In order to eliminate the doubt as to the presence
or lack of a divorce, and in order to discharge the burden placed
uPon her, 30 we think the first wife should have exhausted a search
of these public records.' 3 ' (Emphasis added.)
Ademption of foreign realty
Eisenschenk v. Fowler,5 2 led the court into the difficult area of
determining what law should be applicable to resolve the question of
ademption of foreign land. T executed a will'3 3 and codicil in February
1953 devising certain Illinois real property to appellants. Several months
later T and appellants entered into a contract for sale of the land and four
months thereafter T died. It is not clear whether the deed and mortgage
were ever exchanged in accordance with the contract. Action is brought
to determine whether appellants took under will or contract. The court
stated a conversion from fee simple owner to vendor, or in event of the
C
126. The case was made to turn on the decisive question of the weight to be given
the finding of a master and Florida law was used on that point. Id. at 547.
127. 93 So.2d 874 (Fla. 1957).
128. Under FLA. STAT. § 440.16(2)(c) (1957).
129. Particularly this language of the court, note 127 supra at 876, "A solution ...
merely requires the application of certain well-established rules heretofore announced by
our prior decisions."
130. Note, the burden is placed upon her by Florida law.
131. Ibid.
132. 82 So.Zd 876 (Fla. 1955).
133. Execution of the will is assumed in Florida although the abbreviated record as
stated by the court does not pronounce on this point. Note 132 supra at 877.
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exchange, mortgage, was sufficient to show the change of intention neces-
sary to bring about the ademption.
While distinguishing the case on the facts of this will, the court cited
with approval lit re l)ublin's EstateL"a which had properly referred the
question to the situs of the land.'-"" At least the approval of the Dublin
rule is apparent, if not clear, since the court goes on to state:
In Illinois, where the land in question was situated, the
common law rule is evidently recognized and the conveyance of
realty previously devised amounts to an adeniption . . I , and
so far as we are advised that nle has not been abrogated by statute
in that State.
37
Unfortunately the court then added that the rule seemed to be the
same in Florida thereby clouding the holding. It would have been better
to dismiss the appellant's arguments categorically by stating that no policy
exists at the forum to set aside the normal reference to the situs of foreign
land for the purpose of determining the intention of the testator. Perhaps
in subsequent cases the court will be willing to make this clarification.
Law applicable to foreign will
The final important choice-of-law case decided in the period under
survey was Colclazier v. Colclazier." 8 Under construction by the court
was the effect of a will executed by T in 1950 in New Mexico. Plaintiffs in
the action were the children of T and W,. It was found that while T
and W,, the defendant here, were .'married" in 1934, the defectiveness
of T's Mexican divorce from V, prevented them from entering into a valid
marriage until 1949, some years after the death of XV,. It was further found
that the property in question had been acquired before this valid second
marriage and hence was not impressed with community status under New
Mexican law. On the sale of the property to T and W. without more a
tenancy in common was created. One half went outright to V, and the
other to the estate of 7'. The proceeds, however, went into bank accounts' 9
governed by the law of the place of the contract and the New Mexican
contracts provided for right of survivorship, taking them out of the estate
135. 375 Pa. 599, 101 A.2d 731 (1954).
136. The Pennsylvania court relied on RESTArEMENT, CONFLICT OF Lw, 249,
comment (c) (1934).
137. 82 So.2d at 876.
138. 89 So.2d 261 (Fla. 1956). The holding was an affirmance, in effect, of a
most excellent master's report by the I-Ion. James A. Dixon, Sr. Its excellence is note-
worthy in two regards: (1) the clear statement on the law governing rights
in the bank deposits, quoted by the majority opinion, id. at 263, and (2) the very liberal
attitude, approved by the court at 264, toward notice of foreign law under FLA. STAT.
§ 92.031 (1957).
139. For similar treatment of joint bank accounts see in re Kienle's Estate, 139
N.Y.S.2d 150 (Sur. N.Y. 1955).
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proceeding. In so far as a tenancy by the entirety in the Florida deposits
was created, that law was also given its proper effect. The court found that
the question of election between community rights and taking under the
will had been properly eliminated by the master. 1'40
Even in the fact of doubtful domicile' 4 ' which was found to pre-
ponderate in favor of a Florida domicile, the court very properly applied
the law of the place of making the will to determine the overall intent
of the testator as to the icaning of the community property to be con-
veyed as well as to the deternination of the character of the property that
should be classified within the scope of T's estate.
-4 2
Law applicable to foreign insurance policies
In Neil v. Prudential Insurance Co. 1 3 plaintiff had sued on disability
policies which had been honored for more than twenty years and in reversing
a directed verdict for defendant, Milledge J. stated this rule:
The policies were executed in West Virginia. Whether construed
by West Virginia or Florida law, the rle of construction is a
liberal one.' 4
CONCLUSION
In concluding this survey mention will be made of only one additional
contribution to the field, the excellent symposium on Preventive Law of
Conflicts, 5 because of the importance of a new approach to the field.
For the very fact that the field has once more moved to the forefront, as
mentioned at the outset, has caused such a flood of superior writing that
to select would be invidious. Let the student enrich himself to the fullest
by submerging himself therein.
140. There was a vigorous dissent by Roberts, J., see especially remarks in 89 So.2d
at 267. A discussion of election in a non-conflict case, Lopez v. Lopez, 96 So.2d 463
(Fla. 1957).
141. 89 So.2d at 264.
142. The dissent took the position that the intent of the testator could not have
been to let half the total property pass outside the estate and to give the children only
one half of the remainder, to be divided three ways after payment of estate taxes.
Support in the language of the will, id. at 267, is not found for the proposition that
"he was attempting to dispose of both his and his wife's share of the community prop.
erty." And even if that were his intention, the majority opinion makes it clear that this
could not be done under the applicable New Mexican law.
143. 9 Fla. Supp. 36 (1956).
144. Id. at 37. For another construing the same area of Florida law but this time
in the federal court see, Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Neill, 243 F.2d 193 (5th
Cir. 1957).
145. 21 LAw & CONT.MP. PRoD. 427 (1956).
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